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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1778, Alexander Hamilton noted the importance of incorporat-
ing precedent in the American judicial system: "To avoid an arbi-
trary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them .. ."
The primary purpose of precedent is to create predictability in a
legal system. 2 As the legal system has matured, both federal and
state court systems have incorporated the concept of precedent into
their jurisprudence.3 Conflicts arise, however, where an appellate
court is given only limited authority to set precedent.4 As a result,
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
2. Precedent is established when an appellate court's opinion is binding on
lower courts within its jurisdiction. MARSHALL HouTS ET AL., ART OF ADVOCACY-
APPEALS (MB) § 6.04, at 6-16 (Oct. 3, 1992).
3. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALS 62-72 (1960) (discussing the "leeways" of precedent in American courts).
4. 3 ERIC J. MAGNUSON ET AL., MINNESOTA PRACTICE 83 (2d ed. Supp. 1992).
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the goal of legal predictability may be undermined. In Minnesota,
this dilemma is exemplified by the opinions of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals.
Based on Minnesota's decade of experience with an intermediate
appellate court, this Comment explores the actual and implied pow-
ers of the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the necessity of clarifying
its role in the Minnesota legal system. Part II gives the background
of the current court system, including the history of stare decisis and
the origin of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Part III presents a
comparison of other jurisdictions and how those jurisdictions evalu-
ate the precedential value of intermediate appellate court decisions.
Part IV evaluates the deference given to the decisions of the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals by other Minnesota courts and by federal
courts. Part V concludes with a proposal designed to clarify the role
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals within the Minnesota judicial
system.
II. HISTORY & BACKGROUND
A. Necessity of Stare Decisis
Aside from settling disputes between individual parties, one of the
most important purposes of the judicial system is to create predict-
ability in the law.5 The American judicial system has achieved this
predictability by adhering to prior decisions that have addressed the
relevant legal issue. This concept, referred to as "stare decisis,"6 can
be traced to ancient civilizations 7 and continues to influence the de-
velopment of contemporary jurisprudence.8 In addition to promot-
5. See Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 89, 91
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
6. The doctrine of stare decisis requires that courts follow the reasoning of
prior judicial decisions in analogous subsequent cases. Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories
of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 73 n.1 (Laurence
Goldstein ed., 1987). Literally, stare decisis means "to stand by" or to heed previous
rulings in later cases with similar legal issues. Hours, supra note 2, § 6.04, at 6-15.
7. The Code of the ancient Babylonian King Hammurabi, who reigned circa
1792-1750 B.C., is considered one of the first important codifications of law. A por-
tion of the code states:
If a judge pronounce a judgment, render a decision, deliver a sealed verdict,
and afterward reverse his judgment, they shall prosecute the judge for re-
versing the judgment which he has pronounced, and he shall pay twelve fold
the damages which were (awarded) in said judgment; and publicly they shall
expel him from his seat ofjudgment, and he shall not return, and with the
judges in a case he shall not take his seat.
THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, in LAw-A TREASURY OF ART AND LITERATURE 20, 21 (Sara
Robbins ed., 1990).
8. Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of Our Notion of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW
9, 17-18 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
[Vol. 19
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ing legal predictability,9 stare decisis promotes similar treatment of
individuals in similar situations by allowing courts to rely upon prior
decisions to define permissible conduct under the law.iO In this
manner, stare decisis fosters stability within the legal system.
Yet, some occasions require departure from precedent.II In such
situations, the value of precedent will ultimately "depend... on the
continued vitality of its underlying policies and the validity of its
logic." 12
The principle of stare decisis takes on an added dimension, how-
ever, when applied to decisions of an intermediate appellate court.' 3
An appellate court binds all courts subordinate to it. 14 Frequently,
though, intermediate courts are afforded only persuasive authority
by the courts of other jurisdictions.15 In other words, courts of other
jurisdictions may not consider an intermediate court as defining the
state's law. This inadequate deferential respect thus chills the pro-
gression of stare decisis.
B. History of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
Through the 1960's and 1970's, the number of cases filed with the
Minnesota Supreme Court increased dramatically.1 6 Growing ad-
ministrative responsibilities also burdened the court.17 In response
to this crisis, the court limited oral arguments, sat in partial panels,
increased the number of its judges, and increased its reliance on staff
members. 18 These efforts offered only temporary solutions to an in-
creasing case load. As a result, several alternative solutions were
9. Benditt, supra note 5, at 91.
10. Id. at 90-91.
11. See, e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 25 A.2d 728, 730 (Pa. 1942). In
Colonial Trust, the court stated: "This doctrine [of stare decisis] 'is a salutary one, and
should not ordinarily be departed from, where the decision is of long standing and
rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public policy demand
it.'" Id. (quoting Hoyt v. Martense, 16 N.Y. 231, 233-34 (1857)).
12. Hours, supra note 2, § 6.04, at 6-16.
13. Taylor Mattis & Kenneth G. Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among the Appellate Court of
Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 572 (1979).
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
16. Geoffrey W. Peters, The Problems of Caseload and Delay in the Minnesota Supreme
Court-An Introduction to a Symposium, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 41, 42 (1981). In 1978,
1207 cases were filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court. This number indicated a
five-fold increase in case filings over the number of cases heard only twenty years
earlier. Id.
17. Id. These additional responsibilities included pressure to provide leadership
and supervision over the legal profession, to establish forms of pleadings and rules of
procedure and evidence, and to administer the judicial system. Id.
18. David W. Larson, Jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 10 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 627, 629 (1984).
19931
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proposed, including the creation of an intermediate court of
appeals. 19
The idea of an intermediate court of appeals was met with consid-
erable skepticism.20 In response to the primary concern that a court
of appeals would substitute judgment for that of the supreme
court,2 1 the legislature originally designed the intermediate court to
function only as an error correcting tribunal.22 Following a lengthy
period of debate, the legislature amended the Minnesota Constitu-
tion in 1982.23 The Minnesota Court of Appeals heard its first cases
in 1983.24
In the statutes creating the court of appeals, the Minnesota Legis-
lature gave the court its jurisdictional mandate:
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci-
sions of the trial courts, other than the conciliation courts, of the
state of Minnesota, except that it shall not have jurisdiction of crim-
inal appeals in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of
murder in the first degree.
2 5
19. Id. at 630.
20. See generally Carl Norberg, Some Second and Third Thoughts on an Intermediate
Court of Appeals, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 107 (1981). Among the concerns of
those in opposition to the court were the increase in cost to litigants for double ap-
peals and the increase in the length of time between the initiation of litigation and
final disposition. Id.
21. Cf GREGORY A. LANG & JANET K. MARSHALL, THE CASE FOR A MINNESOTA
COURT OF APPEALS 59 (1980) (discussing the concern that the creation of an interme-
diate court of appeals would undermine the certainty of precedent).
22. HON. PETER S. POPOVICH, BEGINNING A JUDICIAL TRADITION: FORMATIVE
YEARS OF THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS 1983-1987 22 (1987). The correction
of trial errors was to be the primary function of the court of appeals; the formulation
of legal principles and establishing precedent and judicial doctrines was left to the
supreme court. Id.
23. The court of appeals was created by an amendment to the state constitution.
Article 6, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution was amended as follows:
The legislature may establish a court of appeals and provide by law for the
number of its judges, who shall not be judges of any other court, and its
organization and for the review of its decisions by the supreme court. The
court of appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction over all courts, except the
supreme court, and other appellate jurisdictions as prescribed by law.
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (amended 1982).
24. Larson, supra note 18, at 627-28. The original debate over the court of ap-
peals began in the 1960's. While the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to deal
with its caseload problem in other ways, it was eventually decided that the creation of
the court of appeals was the only practical way to deal with its caseload while "main-
taining the integrity of the appellate process." Id. at 629-30. The court began ac-
cepting appeals on August 1, 1983. Id. at 627-28.
25. MINN. STAT. § 480A.06(l) (1982) (amended 1987). The current version now
reads:
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of appeals for all final decisions of the
trial courts, other than the conciliation courts, of the State of Minnesota,
except that it shall not have jurisdiction of appeals in legislative or statewide
(Vol. 19
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While this statute empowered the court of appeals to overrule de-
cisions of the trial court, the statute originally provided no insight in
determining whether the court of appeals' decisions had preceden-
tial authority on issues of Minnesota law.26 Thus, the legislature
amended the statute in 1987 and clearly established that unpub-
lished court of appeals' opinions have no precedential value. 27 The
statute now impliedly provides that a published decision is
precedential.28
The 1987 amendment also prescribed specific criteria for the pub-
lication of appellate court opinions.2 9 The statute provides that the
court of appeals may publish an opinion only if the opinion ad-
dresses a new rule of law, overrules a prior court of appeals' deci-
sion, provides important guidelines in administrative areas, or
significantly aids in the administration of justice.S0
Furthermore, the legislation creating the court of appeals also
election contests or criminal appeals in cases which the defendant has been
convicted of murder in the first degree.
MINN. STAT. § 480A.06(1) (1992).
26. Id. Compare MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(3) (1982) (amended 1987) (discussing
only the time line and the format of the decisions of the court of appeals) with MINN.
STAT. § 480A.08(3) (1992) (discussing in detail the publication of decisions and the
value of those decisions left unpublished).
27. MINN. STAT. § 480A(c)(3) (1988).
28. MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(3)(c). Subdivision three states that "unpublished
opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential." Id. Because the statute states
that unpublished opinions are not precedential, under general principles of statutory
construction, the statute impliedly gives published cases the authority of precedent.
29. MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(3) (1992) (amended 1987).
30. The statute reads in full:
(a) A decision shall be rendered in every case within 90 days after oral argu-
ment or after the final submission of briefs or memoranda by the parties,
whichever is later. The chiefjustice or the chiefjudge may waive the 90-day
limitation for any proceeding before the court of appeals for good cause
shown. In every case, the decision of the court, including any written opin-
ion containing a summary of the case and a statement of the reasons for its
decision, shall be indexed and made readily available.
(b) The decision of the court need not include a written opinion. A state-
ment of the decision without a written opinion must not be officially pub-
lished and must not be cited as precedent, except as law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(c) The court of appeals may publish only those decisions that:
(1) establish a new rule of law;
(2) overrule a previous court of appeals' decision not reviewed by the
supreme court;
(3) provide important procedural guidelines in interpreting statutes or
administrative rules;
(4) involve a significant legal issue; or
(5) would significantly aid in the administration of justice.
Unpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential. Unpublished
opinions must not be cited unless the party citing the unpublished opinion
provides a full and correct copy to all other counsel at least 48 hours before
its use in any pretrial conference, hearing, or trial. If cited in a brief or
memorandum of law, a copy of the unpublished opinion must be provided
19931
5
Anderson: The Minnesota Court of Appeals: A Court without Precedent?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1993
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
gave the Minnesota Supreme Court power to adopt rules of proce-
dure for the court of appeals.31 The Special Rules of Practice for the
Minnesota Court of AppealsS2 endorse the statute governing publi-
cation of opinions that
state the nature of the case and the reasons for the decision. The
publication decision is guided by Minnesota Statutes, section
480A.08, subdivision 3, which provides for publication of opinions
which establish a new rule of law, overrule a previous Court of Ap-
peals decision not reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, pro-
vide important procedural guidelines in interpreting statutes or
administrative rules, involve a significant legal issue, or signifi-
cantly aid in the administration of justice. All other opinions are
unpublished.
3 3
Despite the apparent authority of the court, its structure has also
created some confusion as to the precedential value of its decisions.
The court of appeals is designed to hear cases primarily in panels of
three judges.34 As a result, different panels of the court have occa-
sionally disagreed with each other regarding specific issues.35
to all other counsel at the time the brief or memorandum is served, and
other counsel may respond.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. MINN. STAT. § 480A.11 (1992).
32. These rules, adopted in 1991, replaced the Minnesota Court of Appeals In-
ternal Rules. Order Replacing the Minnesota Court of Appeals Internal Rules (Oct.
25, 1991).
33. SPECIAL R. OF PRAC. FOR THE MINN. CT. APP. 4, reprinted in MINNESOTA RULES
OF COURT 424 (West 1993).
34. MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(l) (1992); SPECIAL R. OF PRAC. FOR THE MINN. CT.
APP. 3, reprinted in MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT 424 (West 1993). The court has, on
occasion, heard cases en banc. See, e.g., State v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 413 N.W.2d
514, 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987). In State v. North-
west Airlines, Justice Leslie voiced his disapproval of the en banc procedure:
I voice my concern over an en banc procedure utilized by this court....
What explains the occurrence of the procedure employed in this case? In
1983, before the initial membership of this court was fully constituted, the
first appointees to the court adopted an internal rule providing for resub-
mission of cases by the court sitting en banc. It is evident to me that this
rule is in conflict with the enabling act for the court, and that we are prohib-
ited as a matter of law from following the procedure permitted by the rule.
Much has been said and written on the need and the peril in attempting
an en banc procedure for decisions of a state's intermediate appellate court.
On the one hand, it is desirable to avoid inconsistent decision making of the
intermediate court; a lawyer's prediction of an appellate decision should not
depend upon the makeup of the appellate panel. Nevertheless, it is equally
evident that an en banc procedure may adversely affect the rights of liti-
gants, usurp the proper appellate role of the supreme court, and become
"ineffective," "wasteful" and "counter-productive" for a court with a large
number of judges.
Id. at 529-30 (citation omitted).
35. See MAGNUSON, supra note 4, at 82-84. The court of appeals may publish
opinions that overrule an earlier decision of that court where the Minnesota Supreme
Court has not reviewed the earlier decision. MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(3)(c)(2) (1992).
[Vol. 19
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Additionally, as a court of review, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
hears a large number of appeals. Since the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals came into existence, its decisions represent a final ruling in
about 95% of the cases appealed in Minnesota.3 6 Because of the
sheer numbers, the court's holdings appear to be authoritative pre-
cedent on Minnesota law. Yet, in deciding the issues of Minnesota
law, federal courts have not recognized the authority of the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals' decisions.37 This unresolved area leaves the
judicial system in Minnesota indecisive and unpredictable.38
III. APPELLATE COURT SYSTEM
A. Federal Appellate Court System
The Minnesota court system is modelled after the federal court
system, a system that also contains an intermediate appellate court
comprised of three-judge panels.39 In theory, these individual
panels are not free to overrule each other but are formally bound by
other panels' decisions in the same circuit.40
The denial of review by a higher court creates similar problems for
both the federal circuit courts of appeal and the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. In refusing to grant certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court provides no indication whether a circuit court decision was de-
cided correctly.41 Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court gives no
In cases with inconsistent holdings, the authoring judge must circulate a draft opin-
ion to all other court members for "their information and comment." SPECIAL R. OF
PRAC. FOR THE MINN. CT. APP. 5, .reprinted in MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT 424 (West
1993). This step appears to serve the purpose of alerting the court to potentially
conflicting decisions.
36. 1991 MINN. CTS: MANAGING IN AN ERA OF LIMITED RESOURCES AND GROWING
DEMANDS ANN. REP. at 14. See also infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Anderson Named New ChiefJudge of Appeals Court, MSBA IN BRIEF, Sept.
1992, at 4. As an attorney, Anderson "occasionally heard criticisms that the [appel-
late] court's decisions were inconsistent, raising confusion among attorneys consider-
ing appeals." Id.
39. 8TH CIR. R. & P. Internal Operating Procedures I-D.
40. IB JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402, at 1-18 (2d
ed. 1993). Panel decisions are generally treated as precedent unless overruled by the
court sitting en banc. Although it is considered improper for one panel to overrule
another, judges admit that they will indirectly overrule a prior opinion by distinguish-
ing cases, narrowing prior decisions or employing other subtle tactics. J. WOODFORD
HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEAL IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 210 (1981).
The governing statute in Minnesota, however, expressly allows for the eventual-
ity of individual panels overruling each other. MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(c)(2) (1992).
41. See Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Some of the same considerations are used in summary dis-
positions of appeals and in denials of certiorari. Sidle, 429 U.S. at 948. In Sidle, Jus-
tice Brennan argued that decisions rendered without plenary consideration, whether
by summary disposition or denial of certiorari, are considered by the lower courts,
1993]
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guidance regarding the relative precedential value of a court of ap-
peals' decision when denying a petition for review.42 As in the fed-
eral system, Minnesota's practice gives courts and practitioners no
guidance to discern whether a denial for review of an issue by the
Minnesota Supreme Court means that a case was decided correctly
or whether the case simply presented an issue that the supreme court
was not interested in hearing at that particular time. Thus, where the
Minnesota Supreme Court has issued a denial of a petition for re-
view, the relative value of a court of appeals' decision is unknown.
B. Other State Appellate Court Systems
Currently thirty-seven states have an intermediate appellate court
in their court system.43 Minnesota's judicial system operates as a
three-tiered system of organization resembling the federal system
and consisting of "a court of last resort .... an intermediate appel-
late court .... and a trial court for all original proceedings."44 The
power relationship between a state supreme court and its intermedi-
ate appellate court rests largely upon the statutory jurisdiction of the
courts.
4 5
Several states have addressed the issue of the precedential value of
their appellate court decisions through legislative enactments, 46
court mandated rules47 and constitutional provisions.48 Wisconsin is
practicing attorneys, and the Supreme Court Justices as not having the same prece-
dential force as decisions rendered with plenary consideration. Id. By denying certi-
orari in Sidle, Brennan argued the resulting summary dispositions, "regardless of the
maturity of the issue, and regardless of the fact that even when the issue is before
[the Court] for the first time, [the Court's] disposition is made without opinion, with-
out briefing or oral argument, and after only the most cursory conference discus-
sion," must be followed as fully binding. Id. at 949-50.
42. See, e.g., Murphy v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Minn.
1986). Sup. Ct. R. 17 (outlining criteria for granting certiorari) is similar to Minne-
sota's Rule outlining discretionary review of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Neither
rule, however, specifies the controlling criteria to be used in exercising discretion to
grant review. Id. See also MAGNUSON, supra note 4, at 335.
43. The remaining thirteen states without intermediate court systems are Dela-
ware, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Da-
kota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS: STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1987
Map 1, at 4 (1988).
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id. at 5. The intermediate courts of five of these states serve as an overflow
court for the caseload of the court of last resort. Id. In these systems, the high court
receives the appeal and assigns the case to the intermediate court. Id.
46. Some state statutes give precedential authority only to the published, and
not the unpublished, decisions of the court of appeals. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 480A.08(3) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 752.41(2) (1981).
47. For example, Indiana provides that "[uniless specifically designated 'For
Publication,' memorandum decisions shall not be published nor shall they be re-
(Vol. 19
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an excellent example of a state court system that has used each of
these mechanisms to give clear definition to its intermediate appel-
late court. The Wisconsin legislature expressly addressed the issue
of precedential value of intermediate appellate court's opinions by
stating "officially published opinions of the court of appeals shall
have statewide precedential effect."49 The legislature has further
provided that the Wisconsin Supreme Court may not respond to a
certified question of law on an issue that the court of appeals has
addressed in a published opinion.50 One commentator reasoned
that this statute meant the published decisions of the appellate court
are binding precedents not only on lower courts but on all courts of
all jurisdictions, unless overruled by the Wisconsin Supreme
garded as precedent nor cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of resjudicata, collateral estoppel or the law of the case." IND. R. APp. P.
15(A)(3) (1992).
Other state courts have developed rules to guide the resolution of conflicting
opinions of intermediate court panels. For example, in Michigan, when a court of
appeals panel issues an opinion in conflict with a prior opinion of another panel, the
judges of the most recent decision must certify the conflict by order. Gail Rodwan,
Criminal Procedure, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 447, 503 (1989). Similarly, Wisconsin statutes
instruct the judiciary committee of the legislative council to examine any decision
made by the court of appeals which held that a Wisconsin statute was in "conflict,
ambiguous or unconstitutional." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.83, at Legislative Council
Note-1977 (1986).
48. For example, the Florida constitution provides that intermediate appellate
court decisions are binding precedent unless reviewed by the state supreme court.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3, cl. b (amended 1986), interpreted in Taylor Mattis & Kenneth
G. Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among the Appellate Court of Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571,
598 n.121 (1979).
In its constitution, Wisconsin has also addressed the precedential power of its
intermediate court. Although Wisconsin's appellate court is not a court of last resort,
its constitutional provision encourages the intermediate court to supervise the devel-
opment of common law as well as the correction of errors. See Jonathan Erving
Marsh, State v. Schumacher: Dual Standards of Review for Waived Claims or Error in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 773, 794-95 (1989).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re Court of Appeals, 263 N.W.2d 149, 149-50
(Wis. 1978), stated: "[T]he Court of Appeals has one administrative headquarters,
namely Madison, although panels of the Court sit in numerous locations in the state.
The published decision of any one of the panels has binding effect on all panels of
the Court." Id. at 149-50.
49. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 752.41(2) (1981).
50. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (1981 & Supp. 1992). This statute fully provides:
The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the
supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States
or the highest appellate court of any other state when requested by the certi-
fying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law
of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the
certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court and the court of
appeals of this state.
1993]
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Court.5 ' Thus, Wisconsin's process clearly establishes the preceden-
tial value of appellate court decisions and leaves little confusion re-
garding the state of Wisconsin's case law.
IV. AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. Minnesota Supreme Court Review of Court of Appeals' Decisions
In its first decade of existence, 20,841 cases were filed with the
Minnesota Court of Appeals.52 Approximately four percent of these
cases were eventually reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme Court.5 3
Of the cases reviewed by the supreme court, approximately forty-two
51. See supra Marsh, note 48, at 781-82 n.37.
52. Letter from Eric Stumne, Research Analyst, Minnesota Supreme Court, to
William Mitchell Law Review (March 3, 1993) (on file with the William Mitchell Law
Review).
53. The following charts reflect the outcome of appellate decisions during the
years 1983-92.
Court of Appeals 1983-1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
Filings 9,214 2,400 2,067 2,470 2,308 2,382 20,841
Disposition 8,465 2,270 2,171 2,364 2,150 2,311 19,731
Accelerated 39 11 4 3 6 6 69
Review Granted
Review Granted 45 16 7 3 2 3 76
by Supreme
Court
Supreme Court 1983-1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
PFR* Filed 2,052 631 685 629 687 746 5,430
PFR* Decided 1,971 629 657 605 632 720 5,214
PFR* Denied 1,539 517 572 534 541 633 4,336
PFR* Granted 416 106 83 70 85 84 844
Other 16 6 2 1 6 3 34
*Petitions for Review
Action on 1983-1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
PFR Granted
Affirmed 90 22 24 16 16 31 199
Affirmed In Part 81 17 19 21 8 14 160
Dismissed 18 6 8 2 0 3 37
Remanded 18 3 11 13 7 8 60
Reversed 103 37 30 42 19 33 234
Reversed & 39 7 7 2 2 9 66
Remanded
Prepared by: Research and Statistics Office, Wayne Kobbervig, Director Minnesota
Supreme Court, 25 Constitution Avenue, Suite 120, Saint Paul, MN 55155.
[Vol. 19
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percent were reversed or remanded.54 Based on these statistics, ap-
proximately ninety-eight percent of Minnesota Court of Appeals de-
cisions are final. Practically speaking, these decisions should have
some precedential effect on Minnesota law.
The supreme court first discussed the issue of the precedential
value of Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions in 1986. In Murphy
v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. ,55 the Minnesota Court of Appeals fol-
lowed Boroos v. Roseau Agency, Inc.,56 a prior court of appeals' deci-
sion. Boroos appeared to have final precedential authority because,
two years earlier, the supreme court had denied petition for re-
view.57 Although the issues in the two cases were identical, the
supreme court granted a petition for review of Murphy.58
Without explicitly reversing the Boroos decision, the supreme court
refused to follow the court of appeals' holding in Murphy 59 and af-
forded no deference to the decision of the court of appeals. 60 The
court stated:
"Review of any decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary
with the Supreme Court." Consequently, denial of a petition for
further review means no more than that the supreme court has de-
clined, at that time and for whatever undisclosed reasons, to con-
sider the matter.6 1
54. This calculation includes those cases that were reversed or remanded in part.
Id.
55. 368 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, 388 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1986).
56. Id. at 738 (citing Booros v. Roseau Agency, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984), review denied, (Minn. Dec. 24, 1984)).
57. Murphy, 368 N.W.2d at 757 (citing Booros, 345 N.W.2d at 788).
58. Murphy, 388 N.W.2d at 738-39.
59. Id. at 739.
60. In Murphy v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. 1986), the
supreme court based its position on MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 117. Rule 117 states:
Review of any decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary with the
Supreme Court. The following criteria may be considered:
(a) the question presented is an important one upon which the
Supreme Court should rule; or
(b) the Court of Appeals has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute;
or
(c) the lower courts have so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of justice as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervi-
sory powers; or
(d) a decision by the Supreme Court will help develop, clarify, or har-
monize the law; and
(1) the case calls for the application of a new principle or policy; or
(2) the resolution of the question presented has possible statewide im-
pact; or
(3) the question is likely to recur unless resolved by the Supreme
Court.
MINN. R. App. P. 117(2).
61. Murphy, 388 N.W.2d at 739 (citing MINN. R. App. P. 117(2)) (citation omit-
ted). Similarly, in L.K. v. Gregg, 425 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1988), the court stated:
1993]
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The court compared its refusal to review a case with the United
States Supreme Court's power to grant certiorari, where "a denial of
certiorari cannot be interpreted as an adjudication or expression of
opinion on the merits of the case." 62 Because of the absolute discre-
tion of the Minnesota Supreme Court to grant review of a court of
appeals' decision, the finality of those decisions in which a petition
for review is denied remains unclear.
More than the facts of a case, the makeup of the supreme court,
and the nature of the appeal may predict whether the supreme court
grants review of a particular case.63 The supreme court's lack of gui-
dance in this area is due, in large part, to its formula for accepting
cases of first impression. The supreme court has allowed the court
of appeals to determine several cases of first impression without fur-
ther review.64 In Garrick v. Northland Insurance Co. ,65 the supreme
Nevertheless, as we have stressed already, the court's holding in Gregg I
must be accepted as the settled law of the case. We will not allow respon-
dents to relitigate the same issue. Our comments here are intended only to
make clear our view that we are merely applying the law of this case. By so
doing, we do not intend to give unwarranted precedential effect to our de-
nial of the petition for review in Gregg I.
Id. at 821. See also State v. Shamp, 427 N.W.2d 228, 230-31 n.3 (Minn. 1988) (warn-
ing that "a denial of a petition for review should not be interpreted to mean that we
endorse either the reasoning of the court of appeals or the result."); Mattson v. Un-
derwriters at Lloyds of London, 414 N.W.2d 717, 722 n.9 (Minn. 1987) (remarking
that "a denial of a petition for further review by [the supreme court] is of no prece-
dential effect and is not to be construed as approving or disapproving the court of
appeals decision.").
62. Murphy, 388 N.W.2d at 739. The court went on to explain the significance of
a denial of a petition for review:
The temptation to read significance into a denial of a petition for further
review is best resisted. The denial does not give the court of appeals deci-
sion any more or less precedential weight than a court of appeals decision
from which no review was sought. The denial "means only that, for one
reason or another which is seldom disclosed, and not infrequently for con-
flicting reasons which may have nothing to do with the merits and certainly
may have nothing to do with any view of the merits taken by a majority of
the Court, there were not [three] members of the Court who thought the
case should be heard."
Id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953)).
63. Id. Chief Justice Keith indicates that those cases raising serious constitu-
tional or statutory challenges or seeking clarification of the law are the most impor-
tant for the supreme court to consider. Letter from A.M. (Sandy) Keith, ChiefJustice
of the Minnesota Supreme Court, to author (March 4, 1993) (on file with the William
Mitchell Law Review). Further, Chief Justice Keith placed importance on those cases
"where the standard of review was not properly applied by the appellate court, so as
to clarify these standards and prevent the retrying of cases." Id. Even in cases where
the court could properly exercise its discretion to review, review may be denied if the
supreme court agrees with the overall decision of the appellate court or if the deci-
sion is not published. Id.
64. Although the court of appeals has decided several cases of first impression,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has apparently placed little significance on this fact in
deciding whether to grant review. See notes 60-73 and accompanying text. Indeed,
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court granted a petition for review on an issue that had been decided
several times by the court of appeals. 66 The supreme court had de-
nied review of each of the prior cases dealing with the issue.67 In
hearing Garrick, the supreme court expressly reviewed the case as
one of first impression.68 In reversing the prior holdings of the
court of appeals, the supreme court implied that, while the court of
appeals does have the power to determine cases of first impression, if
that same issue reaches the supreme court, it will be reviewed again
as a case of first impression.69
Contrary to its implication in Garrick, less than two years later, the
supreme court chastised the court of appeals for exceeding its au-
thority by deciding a case of first impression. In Pike v. Gunyou,70 the
supreme court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, finding
the analysis of the issues in the case unnecessary to the result.7 '
Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Keith admonished the court of
appeals for exceeding the bounds of appropriate appellate review. 72
the reasons used to grant review are generally unknown. In In re Florance, 360
N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1985), Justice Simonett stated: "[W]e might add that labeling a
legal issue as one of first impression sometimes gives it an aura of importance or
significance it does not deserve. There are few appellate legal issues, if suitably
framed, that cannot be said to be of 'first impression.' " Id. at 632 n.3.
65. Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1991), rev', 460
N.W.2d 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
66. Compare Garrick, 469 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1991), rev', 460 N.W.2d 920
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) with Sutherland v. Allstate Ins., 464 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990), review denied, (Minn. March 15, 1991) and Wondra v. American Family
Ins. Group, 432 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 25,
1989), overruled by Garrick, 469 N.W.2d at 714.
67. Garrick, 469 N.W.2d at 713.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 714 n.2.
70. 488 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. Ct. App.), vacated, 491 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1992).
This case involved a taxpayer suit challenging legislation authorizing a bond issue for
a locally based airline. Id. at 298. In upholding the trial court, the court of appeals
issued an opinion as to the standing of other taxpayers. Judge Crippen, in a concur-
ring opinion, viewed the result of the court of appeals' decision as an invitation to
future lawsuits:
By broadcasting the threat of future litigation, an advisory opinion deliber-
ately risks creating a de facto injunction prohibiting issuance and sale of
these state bonds. Critics of the 1991 enactment may applaud this result,
but misuse of the appellate decision-making process is never praiseworthy.
None can be comforted to know that an intermediate appellate court panel
can determine vital matters of law or policy by extrajudicial pronounce-
ments on hypothetical, future cases.
Id. at 309.
71. Pike v. Gunyou, 491 N.W.2d 288 (Minn.), rev g, 488 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
72. Id. at 289-90. Justice Keith paralleled the criticism of Judge Crippen's con-
currence to the court of appeals' opinion. The supreme court opinion stated:
By addressing matters unrelated to those issues and by considering matters
unrelated to its appellate task of reviewing the exercise of the trial court's
1993]
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The court directed that neither the majority nor the concurring opin-
ions be given dispositional or precedential value. 73 This evaluation
once again called into question the ability of the court of appeals to
create precedent in Minnesota law and appeared to restrict the court
of appeals to the function of error correction.
B. The Court of Appeals' Review of Its Own Decisions
As an intermediate appellate court, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals is designed to hear cases more expediently than the supreme
court.7 4 This goal is accomplished by having the judges sit in panels
rather than conducting en banc hearings. 75 This procedure has, on
occasion, resulted in inconsistent decisions between panels.76 This
inconsistency results in a lack of clarity in determining whether one
panel's decision is binding on another panel in a subsequent case. 77
When faced with such a dilemma, the panel may distinguish the prior
discretion, the majority has inappropriately injected uncertainty as to the
finality of its ultimate disposition affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
action with prejudice.
Id. at 290 n. 1. Similarly, in his concurrence, Judge Crippen had stated:
Our lawful role in this case is remarkably limited. Our only duty is to deter-
mine whether or not the trial court erred in applying Minn. Stat. § 562.02
(1990), either in choosing to impose or in formulating the amount or condi-
tions of a surety bond. The law does not permit us to issue an advisory
opinion, a "hold[ing]," on a question that is not before the court-the issue
of whether in the future other taxpayers can maintain litigation on the same
constitutional claims now unsuccessfully advanced by appellants.
Pike, 488 N.W.2d at 308. Judge Crippen further cautioned that "deliberate disre-
gard" for the proper scope of review results in dicta opinions that are not binding in
subsequent cases. Id. at 310.
73. Pike v. Gunyou, 491 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. 1992). Justice Keith wrote: "We
therefore vacate the majority and concurring opinions of the court of appeals, and
direct that those opinions shall have neither dispositional nor precedential value."
Id. (citations omitted).
74. POPOVICH, supra note 22, at 37.
75. SPECIAL R. OF PRAC. FOR THE MINN. CT. APP. 3, reprinted in MINNESOTA RULES
OF COURT 424 (West 1993).
76. Compare Lee v. Indus. Elec., 375 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), aft'd,
389 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1986) with Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., 368 N.W.2d 16
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 380 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1986). In Lee, the court of
appeals refused to follow the earlier court of appeals decision in Lovgren, a case deal-
ing with the same issue. In recognizing the prior case law, the Lee majority stated:
We found a difference between statutes of limitations and substantive stat-
utes in [Lovgren]. The resolution of the issue of retroactive application of
§ 541.051 in Lovgren was neither involved with, nor necessary to, the resolu-
tion of that case. We consider that portion of the decision to be obiter dictum
and therefore of no precedential value.
Lee, 375 N.W.2d at 575 (citation omitted). In dissent to the majority in Lee, Chief
Judge Popovich objected to the indirect overruling of Lovgren, especially since Lovgren
was before the supreme court on petition for review. Id. at 575 (Popovich, CJ.,
dissenting).
77. MAGNUSON, supra note 4, at 83.
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decision,78 make an exception to a rule, 79 or overrule the prior
holding.8 0
Part of this quandary faced by the court of appeals is inherent in its
position as an intermediate court. Inevitably, occasional inconsisten-
cies will occur among the panels. Yet, these disagreements have led
federal courts to conclude that the Minnesota Court of Appeals func-
tions as an error correcting court rather than a doctrinal court.8 '
Until this lack of clarity is resolved, the legal profession will continue
to be frustrated by the apparent inconsistency of appellate court
decisions.82
C. District Courts' Reliance on Court of Appeals' Decisions
Although Minnesota Supreme Court decisions are clearly binding
on state district courts,83 it is less clear that all court of appeals deci-
sions have the same effect in binding the lower courts.8 4 Even
though court of appeals' decisions are considered binding at the trial
court level, reconciliation of conflicting decisions and interpreting
the importance of a denial of a petition for review by the supreme
court is difficult at best.85 In evaluating inconsistent opinions, it may
be useful to recall that the court of appeals was originally designed as
an error-correcting court.8 6 Over time, however, this construction is
78. This alternative allows overruling of a prior decision simply by recognizing
that a trial court has considerable discretion in applying the law to the facts of a
particular case. While the court is obligated to verify that the lower court has fol-
lowed established precedent and, as much as possible, is obligated to follow that
precedent itself, the discretion of the trial court may be used to justify the results
obtained. See Houtrs, supra note 2, § 6.04 at 6-14. Contra Morgan v. Illinois Farmers
Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (implying that the court of appeals
must follow another panel's statutory interpretation when the facts are similar).
79. This technique is far from new. See, e.g., Pacific Fire Ins. v. Kenny Boiler &
Mfg., 201 Minn. 500, 277 N.W. 226 (1937). In Pacific Fire, the court addressed a rule
as "primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions." Id. at 503,
277 N.W. at 228.
80. One way to avoid following such precedent is to conclude that the prior rul-
ing was dictum and therefore not binding precedent. Hourrs, supra note 2, § 6.04, at
6-16. This theory is based on the fact that many appellate decisions, despite the
ultimate holding, contain dicta. Id. § 6.04, at 6-15. Minnesota statutes expressly pro-
vide for this eventuality.
81. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
82. See Anderson Named New Chief Judge of Appeals Court, MSBA IN BRIEF, Sept.
1992, at 4 [hereinafter Anderson Named New Chie]].
83. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
84. MAGNUSON, supra note 4, at 82-83.
85. See supra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
86. PoPOVICH, supra note 22, at 22. By construing the court's function strictly as
an error-correcting body, the court of appeals' opinions have very limited value to
trial courts as persuasive authority. The value of the court's opinions is based solely
upon the court's reasoning, thoroughness of research, and reasonableness of its con-
clusions. MAGNUSON, supra note 4, at 83.
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of limited use. Law generated by the court of appeals represents the
vast majority of Minnesota case law.8 7 Because of its expanded role,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals must be treated as having preceden-
tial weight.
D. Federal Courts' Review of Court of Appeals' Decisions
In diversity cases, federal courts have jurisdiction over state law
issues. In such cases, federal courts are required to follow applicable
state law.88 Yet, the way in which federal courts must ascertain and
apply this law is unclear.89 Federal courts are clearly bound by appli-
cable state supreme court decisions.9 0 Whether federal courts are
bound by intermediate appellate court decisions regarding issues not
yet authoritatively addressed by the state supreme court is an un-
resolved issue. The test most often used by federal courts is whether
the federal court reasons that an intermediate appellate court deci-
sion is an accurate reflection of the way the state supreme court
would rule on the issue.91
The primary federal court of original jurisdiction in Minnesota is
the U.S. District Court for the State of Minnesota.92 The federal dis-
trict court recently stated that Minnesota Court of Appeals' opinions
are not binding in the federal district courts.9 3 Specifically, the fed-
eral district court found that a decision of a state intermediate appel-
late court is " 'datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persua-
sive data that the highest court of the state would decide
87. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
88. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
89. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661-63 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
90. Id. at 661. In McKenna, the Third Circuit stated that, "[i]n those few in-
stances in which the highest state court has recently spoken to the precise question at
issue in a particular setting, the duty of the federal court to determine and apply state
law is easily met." Id. The court further stated that " 'the State's highest court is the
best authority on its own law.' " Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387
U.S. 456, 465 (1965)).
91. McKenna, 622 F.2d at 661.
92. MARK I. WEINSTEIN, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LITIGATION 16 (2d ed. 1986).
The state of Minnesota constitutes one judicial district and is divided into six divi-
sions. 28 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
93. Nelson Distrib. v. Stewart-Warner Indus. Balancers, 808 F. Supp. 684 (D.
Minn. 1992). The court stated: "In the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, federal
courts are bound by the decisions of the state's highest court .... Id. at 687 (citing
Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 777 F.2d 1325, 1329 (8th Cir. 1985) and Meyer v.
Tenvoorde Motor Co., 714 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Minn. 1989)). Further, "[w]hen
state law is unclear or unsettled, 'it is the duty of a federal court to apply the rule it
believes the state supreme court would follow.' " Nelson Distrib., 808 F. Supp. at 687
(quoting Garoogian v. Medlock, 592 F.2d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 1979)).
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has the power to review de
novo decisions of the Minnesota federal district courts in matters of
state law.9 5 The Eighth Circuit recently agreed with the federal dis-
trict court's evaluation of state intermediate court decisions and ac-
corded no precedential value to the Minnesota Court of Appeals'
decisiouis.96
In Haugen v. Total Petroleum, Inc. ,97 the federal district court ruled
that a new, longer statute of limitations did not apply retroactively to
Minnesota Human Rights Act cases. 98 While the appeal of Haugen to
the Eighth Circuit was pending, the Minnesota Court of Appeals de-
cided Wschola v. Snyder,99 and held that the longer statute of limita-
tions in Haugen should be applied retroactively.100 In light of
Wschola, the Eighth Circuit remanded Haugen back to the federal dis-
trict court to determine whether Wschola was controlling.' 0 ' On re-
mand, the federal district court held that the Minnesota Supreme
Court was unlikely to follow the Wschola opinion and reaffirmed its
earlier judgment that the statute of limitations did not apply
retroactively. 102
On subsequent appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district
court and rejected the reasoning applied by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in Wschola.103 Notwithstanding the fact that the Minnesota
94. Nelson Distrib., 808 F. Supp. at 687 (quoting West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237
(1940)). In Nelson, the federal district court determined that the Minnesota Supreme
Court would have decided otherwise and chose to disregard the decision of the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals. Id. at 688.
95. Haugen v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 971 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir. 1992).
96. Id.
97. 791 F. Supp. 788 (D. Minn.), aff'd 971 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1992).
98. Id. at 791. The plaintiff, in Haugen, sued Total Petroleum for disability dis-
crimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, for an act occuring on
July 1, 1988. Id. at 789. The plaintiff filed suit on June 21, 1989. Total Petroleum
moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit had not been filed within the applicable stat-
ute of limitations. Id. Total argued the 300-day statute of limitations, which was in
effect at the time of the alleged discrimination, controlled. Id. The statute of limita-
tions was extended to one year, effective August 1, 1988. Haugen argued that the
new statute of limitations applied retroactively to the case and that he had filed within
the correct period. Id.
99. 478 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 10, 1992).
100. Id. at 228.
101. Haugen v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 960 F.2d 762, 763 (8th Cir. 1992).
102. Haugen, 791 F. Supp. 788, 791 (D. Minn. 1992), aff'd, 971 F.2d 124 (8th Cir.
1992).
103. Haugen, 971 F.2d at 126. The Eighth Circuit applied MINN. STAT. § 645.21
(1947) to conclude that retroactive application of a statute is appropriate only where
there is clear evidence of legislative intent to that effect. Id. at 125 (discussing State
v. Traczyk, 421 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1988)). In Wschola, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals distinguished the cases relied upon by the Eighth Circuit on the basis that they
were criminal cases. 478 N.W.2d at 227. While considering Haugen, the Eighth Cir-
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Supreme Court had denied review of Wschola, the Eighth Circuit con-
curred that the Minnesota Supreme Court would have resolved the
issue against the court of appeals' decision.104
As a result of these decisions and this doctrine, there is a split of
authority on this issue between the Minnesota Court of Appeals and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. If the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals' decisions were given explicit statutory precedential value in all
courts, the lack of clarity in this area would be resolved, and federal
courts would be required to follow its decisions as binding
precedent. 105
V. PROPOSAL
When the Minnesota Court of Appeals was originally conceived,
the court was not intended to be the law creating body that it has
become.106 In its first decade of existence, it is clear that the court of
appeals has created new policies.107 Further, the state bar has
formed a general reliance upon the decisions of the court in formu-
lating arguments and supporting conclusions.108 Yet, this reliance
may be nothing more than false security. Because of the potential
cuit rejected this distinction, holding that the Minnesota Supreme Court relies on
statutory construction, not the type of case. 971 F.2d at 126. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has, however, excepted workers' compensation cases from this pre-
sumption. Id. at 125. It was this exception that the court of appeals used to apply the
new statute in Wschola. 478 N.W.2d at 227.
In another Eighth Circuit case addressing the precedential value of appellate
court decisions, the Eighth Circuit discussed reliance upon an unpublished decision
from the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Elliott v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 967 F.2d
1258 (8th Cir. 1992). Here, the court stated that " 'unpublished opinions of the
court of appeals are not precedential' " and any conflict between published and un-
published decisions must be resolved by the Minnesota courts. Id. at 1261 n.2. (cit-
ing MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(3) (1990)).
104. Haugen, 971 F.2d at 126. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court denied
review of Wschola, the Eighth Circuit rationalized that
[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court has specifically limited its exception to the
mandate in section 645.21 to worker's compensation cases .... [The] Court
based its analysis . . . on statutory construction .... Therefore, we conclude
the Minnesota Supreme Court did not intend to limit its holding.., and we
hold that the Minnesota Supreme Court, if faced with the present case,
would ... hold that the new, longer limitations period should not be applied
retroactively.
Id.
105. Wisconsin takes this approach. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
To date, there are no federal cases in which a decision from the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals has been ignored as having no precedential value.
106. The intent was to create an intermediate court of corrections, thus leaving
the formulation of legal principles and development of precedent and judicial doc-
trine to the supreme court. See POPOVICH, supra note 22, at 22, 37.
107. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
108. Anderson Named New Chief, supra note 82, at 1.
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inconsistency between panels,109 the possibility of reversal by the
supreme court,"l 0 and the failure of the federal courts to give
credence to the opinions of the court of appeals,III the decisions of
the court of appeals may not carry authoritative weight.
Because a vast majority of Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions
are not reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme Court,'12 the final out-
come of the legal issues in those cases remain uncertain. As a result,
a lawyer cannot rely on court of appeals' cases in determining a
course of conduct. A look at the appellate systems in other states
suggests at least three effective methods of remedying this situation:
legislation, judicially-created rules of procedure, and case law.
The first alternative is for the Minnesota Legislature to create a
statute that gives Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions express
precedential authority in both state and federal courts." 3 Wisconsin
109. See supra notes 34-35, 76-82 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text. While the supreme court is
always free to overrule the court of appeals, a very small percentage of cases are
accepted by the supreme court for review. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Since this review is discretionary, the failure of the supreme court to review a case is
not indicative of how the supreme court would decide the issue. See supra notes 55-
73.
111. See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 52-53. See also PoPovICH, supra note 22, at 37.
113. State statutes could be altered to specifically state that all published opinions
have precedential authority. This would significantly increase the value of a pub-
lished appellate decision and would further decrease the importance of unpublished
decisions. The appropriate statute to be amended is MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(3)
(1992). In Wisconsin, the decisions selected for publication are carefully considered.
In order to be publishable, the Wisconsin statute requires that the case
1. Enunciates a new rule of law or modifies, clarifies or criticizes an existing
rule;
2. Applies an established rule of law to a factual situation significantly dif-
ferent from that in published opinions;
3. Resolves or identifies a conflict between prior decisions;
4. Contributes to the legal literature by collecting case law or reciting legis-
lative history; or
5. Decides a case of substantial and continuing public interest.
(b) An opinion should not be published when:
1. The issues involve no more than the application of well-settled rules of
law to a recurring fact situation;
2. The issue asserted is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
judgment and the briefs show the evidence is sufficient;
3. The issues are decided on the basis of controlling precedent and no rea-
son appears for questioning or qualifying the precedent;
4. The decision is by one court of appeals judge under § 752.31(2) and (3);
5. It is a per curiam opinion on issues other than appellate jurisdiction or
procedure;
6. It has no significant value as precedent.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.23(1) (West 1992).
There are, however, dangers in legislative rules that guide the authority of the
judicial body. See MAGNUSON, supa note 4, at 12-13. Such statutes have the potential
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is an example of this type of legislation.'t4 Legislation enables the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals to create precedent simply by publish-
ing a decision.t1 5 Wisconsin statutes reinforce this policy by stating
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court may not respond to a certified
question of law that has been addressed by the court of appeals."l
6
These statutes clearly demonstrate that the published opinions of in-
termediate courts are binding precedent for state courts and federal
courts alike.' 17
A second alternative is for the Minnesota Supreme Court to create
a judicial rule that would give formal precedential authority to the
court of appeals' decisions.1 8 By according clear precedential
weight to all court of appeals decisions in which the supreme court
denies review, much of the current uncertainty would be eliminated.
While this rule would add credence to court of appeals' opinions, the
supreme court would still have the ability to overrule such a decision
at a later date.
The final solution would be a decision by the Minnesota Supreme
Court that clearly sets forth the authoritative weight of the decisions
of the court of appeals. This alternative would not require an
amendment to court rules. It could be accomplished by a decision of
the court stating that its refusal to accept review bestows final prece-
dential authority to an intermediate appellate court decision. 19
Whichever method Minnesota employs, the time has come for
of creating a conflict of the separation of powers. The Minnesota Constitution
requires:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments:
legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers prop-
erly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly pro-
vided in this constitution.
MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1. However, the constitution also provides that the legisla-
ture shall have the power to create courts. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. Yet, this
power does not necessarily bestow upon the legislature the authority to create inter-
nal rules of court procedure. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808,
824 (Minn. 1977) (holding that "[tihe legislature may not constitutionally delegate to
the judiciary duties which are essentially administrative in character.").
114. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (Supp. 1992).
115. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 752.41(2) (1981 & Supp. 1992). Cf. Kaun v. Indus. Fire &
Casualty Ins., 436 N.W.2d 321, 331 (Wis. 1989) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting) (recogniz-
ing that precedent had been set by the appellate court and should be followed); State
ex rel. Morke v. Donnelly, 444 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (Dykman, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 455 N.W.2d 893 (Wis. 1990) (arguing appellate
court decisions have precedential effect and ignoring prior decisions by the majority
is incorrect).
116. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (Supp. 1992). See also supra note 50.
117. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 752.41(2) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
118. The appropriate rule to be amended would be MINN. CT. APP. SPEC. R. PRAc.
4.
119. See generally State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 394 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. 1986).
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PRECEDENTAL VALUE
change. Litigants cannot afford to base their arguments on appellate
court opinions that have relatively no more value than secondary au-
thority. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has shown it has the ability
to effectively process its caseload and should be utilized to its full
potential.120 By affording Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions
clear precedential value, the uncertainty of Minnesota case law will
be resolved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The judicial system of this country is based on the principle of
stare decisis. Because the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions
have not been granted overwhelming recognition by the courts, ad-
ditional measures must be taken to ensure that Minnesota Court of
Appeals' decisions are afforded precedential value.
Other state court systems have shown that, by implementing addi-
tional statutes or rules, the decisions of their courts of appeal carry
greater authority in all jurisdictions.121 A change in statute, judicial
rule, or court opinion will ensure certainty to practitioners and
judges alike as to the outcome of the law. State and federal courts
will be equally bound by the decisions, thus affording equal treat-
ment under Minnesota law regardless of the forum.
In addition, this proposed change will not subrogate the authority
of the Minnesota Supreme Court as the highest court of the state.
The supreme court would still have the power to review and to over-
rule the decisions of the court of appeals. The court of appeals
would simply be given the formal recognition that it has received
generally in practice. By recognizing the precedential value of its
decisions, the Minnesota Court of Appeals will be given the predict-
ability and cohesiveness that is the cornerstone of the American judi-
cial system.
120. See Wozniak to Retire from Bench After Career Serving Public, Profession, MSBA IN
BRIEF, Aug. 1992, at 1. The court of appeals has consistently met its requirements by
rendering timely decisions and is one of only two state appellate courts operating
without a backlog. Id.
121. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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